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EXISTENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY
Abstract. Michael Huemer argues, on statistical grounds, that \existence is
evidence for immortality". On reasoning derived from the anthropic principle,
however, mere existence cannot be evidence against any non-indexical, \eter-
nal" hypothesis that predicts observers. This note attempts to advertise the
much-outed anthropic principle's virtues and workings in a new way, name-
ly by calling attention to the fact that it is the primary intension of one's
indexically-described evidence that best characterizes one's epistemic position.
Theories of persons and the Bayesian conception of evidence
Michael Huemer (2019) notes that if the universe is innite, then under certain
natural hypotheses every conguration of \stu" (physical matter, energy, psy-
chons, ectoplasm, whatever) that occurs in a bounded region of it will recur, up
to an arbitrarily ne degree of approximation, innitely many times.1 Since you
occur, presumably, in a nite region of the universe, the conguration of stu that
constitutes you would on these hypotheses recur, to arbitrarily ne approxima-
tion, innitely many times. Call such recurrences your \Poincare clones". If your
Poincare clones are you, you are immortal. So: are your Poincare clones you?
Huemer thinks that this is a question between two substantive theories (and not,
I take it, just a distinction between two ways of talking). Call a theory of persons
on which your Poincare clones are you Permissive. Call a theory of persons on
which your Poincare clones are not you Restrictive. Huemer thinks that statistical
reasoning can decide which theory is correct. I shall argue, however, that Huemer
has neglected something important in his calculations{the anthropic principle.
Huemer begins his discussion by introducing the following seeming truism:
Bayesian Conception of Evidence: E supports H if P (EjH) > P (Ej  H).
He illustrates with an example running (very loosely) as follows. Imagine two
competing hypotheses about an experiment in which participants toss fair coins.
H is the hypothesis that there are 1000 participants and 1000 coins, with each
participant tossing their coin ten times.  H is the hypothesis that (for some
suitable numbering) only participants 1-10 toss their coins. After the experiment
you know that you will be handed a coin, chosen uniformly at random from those
coins that were tossed, and told how that coin landed during the experiment.
Suppose that you are told that the coin landed heads ten consecutive times.
1Huemer alludes to the Poincare recurrence theorem here, although he does neglect to mention
the crucial hypothesis that one is dealing with a volume (measure) preserving transformation.
To tweak an example he discusses where the theorem fails due to unbounded phase space,
consider a system where two particles move apart monotonically, with distance approaching a
nite limit L. This system is bounded in the relevant sense, but states don't recur.
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Huemer considers two candidate expressions that might be taken to capture your
total relevant evidence proposition in an utterance. The rst is indexical: E =
\this specic coin lands heads ten consecutive times". We believe that Huemer
would say here that P (EjH) = P (Ej  H) = 2 10, so that there is no conrma-
tion of H by E. The second is E = \some coin in the experiment lands heads ten
consecutive times". (I'll mostly ignore the second, less tempting expression.)
Now we return to the main argument. Let H be the expression \a Permissive
theory of persons is true", and let  H be the expression \a Restrictive theory of
persons is true". By analogy with the coins case your relevant evidence is captured
by the expression E = \this specic person exists in this century".2 (By \this
specic person" you ostend yourself.) Since according to a Restrictive theory you
get to exist at most once, then assuming the universe is innite, Huemer claims
that P (Ej  H) = 0. But, he goes on to say, Poincare clones of you exist with
positive probability in any given century. So on a Permissive theory you exist
with positive probability in any given century. This implies that P (EjH) > 0, so
by the Bayesian conception of evidence E conrms H. In fact, it refutes  H a.s.
Proponents of anthropic reasoning will see a problem with this argument. For
example, it seems that Huemer translates indexical expressions such as \this spe-
cic person exists in this century" into propositions by their so-called secondary
intension. As is well known, however, it is the expression's primary intension that
most closely tracks the epistemic position of the speaker.3 To wit, if I compose
a specic enough indexical expression, e.g. something like (but far more specic
than) \I am sitting at my desk, there are two computer screens, that I own, in
front of me, several markers that I also own, a broken pencil, a deck of cards
to my left, my cell phone lies to my right (it just buzzed at me), I can see my
garage out my window, as well as my car, a black 2005 Sequoia, my dogs (Ramsey
and Hobbes) are on the couch..." etc. then the primary intension of this expres-
sion should pick out (to some degree...employing the primary intension does not
come to a \description" theory of reference) something like my \epistemic alter-
natives"...the set of contexts that I might occupy, for all I know. In particular, it
should pick out a set of contexts containing those of my Poincare clones.4
Apart from apparently clear-cut intuitions that it is the primary intension that
captures epistemic position (one doesn't, after all, always even know that the
2Or now, which is somewhat stronger, but makes little dierence to what we have to say.
3The terminology is from Chalmers (1996, p. 57): \The primary intension of a concept is
a function from worlds to extensions reecting the way that actual world reference is xed. In
a given world, it picks out what the referent of the concept would be if that world turned out
to be actual." And (p. 64), \Composing the primary intensions of the terms involved yields a
primary proposition, which holds in precisely those contexts of utterance in which the statement
would turn out to express a truth." The secondary intension, meanwhile, treats referring terms
as rigid: \reference is xed in the actual world, depending on how the world turns out...".
4Note that \a context of utterance...is an ordered pair consisting of a world and a center
representing the viewpoint within that world of an agent" (Chalmers 1996) using the expression
in question. This implies, in particular, that the primary intension of an expression picks out
not a classical proposition, but a so-called \centered proposition", i.e. a set of such pairs.
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propositions picked out by the secondary intensions of our asserted indexicals are
true), trying to adapt the secondary intension to this end breeds monsters. For
example, if it's right to identify the secondary intension of \this specic person
exists in this century" with one's evidence in the current case, then it isn't clear
what could prevent one from using it to identify the secondary intension of \this
specic coin lands heads ten consecutive times" with one's evidence in the coins
case. But that leads to disaster, because if H is true and the coin is numbered
above 10, one would thereby get P (Ej  H) = 0, since that specic coin, on its
secondary intension, wouldn't be tossed at all conditional on  H.
No such trouble arises for the primary intension, according to which P (EjH) =
P (Ej  H) = 2 10, consistent with the intuition that neither H nor  H should
be conrmed. Note that on this interpretation the probability of this specic
coin is tossed by that specic participant is 1; you knew prior to being shown the
coin/participant pair that you would arm that indexical.5
Back in the main argument, we can assume that your relevant evidence is cap-
tured by the indexical expession \this specic person exists in this specic centu-
ry". The secondary intension of this expression has positive probability (again by
analogy with the Poincare recurrence theorem, which says that in a nite measure
preserving system almost every orbit originating in a positive measure set returns
to that set with positive asymptotic density) conditional on H (the Permissive
theory) but zero (or innitesimal) probability conditional on :H (the Restrictive
theory). So Huemer's argument would succeed if it were the secondary inten-
sion that tracked epistemic position. Again, though, it is the primary intension
that does this...and if E is the primary intension of the expression \this spe-
cic person exists in this specic century" then E cannot conrm anything, as
P (EjH) = P (Ej  H) = 1. For the primary intension of an utterance is true in
those contexts where it would express a truth...all contexts, in this case.
The ring squad thought experiment
But consider John Leslie's ring squad (cf. Leslie 1996, p. 141).6 If fty marksmen
have just taken aim at you and missed then \I exist now" seems to be, in your
context, evidence for the proposition that someone has conspired to keep you alive.
So is it just wrong to say that \I exist now" cannot be evidence for anything?
The primary intension of \I exist now" does not in fact support the conspiracy
theory{though something like \I was recently convicted, set before a ring squad
and red upon by fty marksmen, and yet I am still alive" does. Most observers
at contexts where the latter is true are at contexts where \someone conspired to
keep me alive" is also true. It is not however the case that most observers at
contexts where \I exist now" is true are at contexts where \someone conspired
5One could decompose the primary intension formally as Ep =W
j
 
j is observed and lands all heads

, where the disjunction runs over all tossed coins
j. Note in particular that Ep 6=
W
j
 
j lands all heads

= some coin lands all heads.
6Thanks to Michael Huemer for calling my attention to this example, and for other helpful
remarks on an earlier draft of this paper.
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to keep me alive" is also true. So \I exist now" is not evidence for \someone
conspired to keep me alive". If you still think that it is, imagine that you fainted
just before the bullets were red and woke up an hour later with amnesia. You
could then truthfully assert \I exist now", but you wouldn't have any evidence for
\someone conspired to keep me alive". Such evidence requires greater specicity.
Huemer responds to the objection that expressions such as \I exist now" cannot
constitute evidence in Section 5.7 of his paper along similar lines:
Some philosophers hold that one's own existence cannot serve as
Bayesian evidence for any hypothesis. The reason is that the epis-
temic probability of one's own existence, in any epistemic position
one might be in, is 100%. By a general theorem of probability, for
any e; h, if P (e) = 1, then P (hje) = P (h). But on a Bayesian concep-
tion of evidential support, e supports h only if P (hje) > P (h). Thus,
it appears that when P (e) = 1, e cannot support h. (...) This claim
has perfectly mundane counterexamples. For instance, the fact that
you exist is obviously evidence, for you, that your parents were not
infertile. (...) Perhaps the critic of Bayesianism would argue that the
preceding example is not genuinely one of Bayesian reasoning, that
there is some account of the reasoning that does not involve appli-
cation of Bayes' Theorem or anything like it. Such a move, however,
would obviate the objection to the argument for Reincarnation. For
whatever account is to be given of how your existence supports that
your parents (were not infertile), that account may be deployed to
explain how your existence supports Reincarnation. (It does not
matter whether the account qualies as truly Bayesian.) Both pieces
of reasoning involve the claim that if a certain hypothesis were true,
one would be less likely to exist than otherwise; hence, one's exis-
tence supports the rejection of that hypothesis. The objection raised
to the reincarnation inference, that you were never uncertain of your
existence, applies just as well to the infertility inference. There is
no reason to think that whatever would block the objection in the
infertility case would somehow allow the objection to succeed in the
reincarnation case.
Huemer's \critic" might be correct to think that the infertility example is not gen-
uinely one of \Bayesian" reasoning.7 Applications of Bayes' theorem require prior
and posterior probability functions. But \my parents were infertile" is indexical,
and the evaluation of an indexical's primary intension requires \situatedness". I
may be able, ex post facto, to construct some prior probability in the expression's
secondary intension (based on facts about the frequency of infertility in the pop-
ulation of adult persons8), but in order to have ex post facto access to a plausible
prior in the expression's primary intension, I would need to entertain, as if from
7Though I wouldn't characterize the critic as a \critic of Bayesianism" for thinking this.
8Since Huemer views the current objection as a species of the \conrmation by old evidence"
problem, I suspect that this may be precisely what he takes himself to be doing.
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a vantage of non-existence, some distribution or other over possible contexts of
utterance. That is, I would have to engage in self-selection (anthropic) reasoning.
Carter's formulation of the anthropic principle
The locus classicus on modern anthropic reasoning is Carter (1983). His formu-
lation of what Huemer calls the Bayesian Conception of Evidence is as follows:
pE(A)
pE(B)
=
pS(EjA)
pS(EjB)
pS(A)
pS(B)
:
We will interpret this equation as follows. E is an indexical expression taken to
capture your current evidence, and pE() = pS(jE). Here pS is a \Selected" or
\Subjective" probability function that Carter is careful to distinguish from \Orig-
inal" or \Objective" probability pO. (It may be helpful to think of pO as objective
chance.) Carter writes: \S denotes the totality of all the selection conditions that
are implied by the hypothesis of application of the theory to a concrete experi-
mental or observational situation, but which are not necessarily included in the
abstract theory". Here a \theory" (or \abstract theory") is a collection of objec-
tive chances, population means or expected statistical frequencies. One may think
of these as probabilities for classical propositions. pS in contrast is dened over
centered propositions, and is sensitive to one's prior distribution over contexts.
Suppose, for example, that you are asleep in a room and that a fair coin is be-
ing tossed in an adjoining room. The coin is tossed two minutes after each tails
toss and one minute after each heads toss. Since the coin is fair, the \abstract
theory" has it that the probability of each toss landing tails is 1
2
, independent of
the other tosses. Suppose now that you wake up and contemplate the indexical
expression \the previous toss landed tails". You should assign this expression's
secondary intension probability 1
2
(in agreement with theory), but the probabil-
ity that you assign to its primary intension should, in the absence of further
evidence, be 2
3
. (In the absence of further evidence, you should take yourself
to have awakened at a uniformly random time.) So here we would say that
pO(\previous toss lands tails") =
1
2
, but pS(\previous toss lands tails") =
2
3
.
Similarly, in the case where B is \my parents were fertile" Carter would say that
pO(B) might be .95 (some gure derived from a fertility baserate), but pS(B)  1.
So it seems plausible to say that, when A is an indexical expression, Carter intends
by pO(A) the probability of the expression's secondary intension, and intends by
pS(A) the probability of the expression's primary intension. Since it is only after
accounting for selection conditions (i.e. employing pS) that Bayes' theorem is
applied, that the posterior pE(B) comes out to be greater than :95 isn't due to
distinctively \Bayesian" reasoning. It's due rather to anthropic reasoning.
The critic's work is not done, though, for as Huemer notes, it doesn't matter
whether we view the infertility example as distinctively \Bayesian" in avor or
not. Some feature of it blocks the critic's objection, so in order for the crit-
ic's objection to the reincarnation argument to be successful, the critic should
say why such blocking does not occur in that particular application. Now the
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feature blocking the critic's objection in the infertility example is plainly that
pS(B) 6= pO(B). So what the critic must show is that in the reincarnation case,
one has pS(H) = pO(H). This is right, I'll argue, for the following reason. In the
reincarnation case the competing expressions H = \some Permissive theory of
persons is true" and  H = \some Restrictive theory of persons is true" are non-
indexical, and the primary intension of a non-indexical expression agrees with its
secondary intension. So, since pS(H) is the probability of H's primary intension
and pO(H) is the probability of H's secondary intension, we have pS(H) = pO(H).
The event/theory distinction
My proposal, then, is that (to some degree of approximation) it is the prima-
ry intension of the expressions to which one would assent that constitute one's
evidence, and that, accordingly, hypotheses communicated by non-indexical ex-
pressions (call these theories) are not subject to the same selection pressures as
hypotheses communicated by indexical expressions (call these events).9
Such an event/theory distinction is implicit in Carter (1983), in that he only
dares apply his anthropic principle to the testing of rival hypotheses A and B
of the \theory" type, and for these pairs always assumes that pS(A)
pS(B)
= pO(A)
pO(B)
. It
is relatively more explicit in Lewis (2001), where one nds the following thought
experiment involving three equally likely theories:
A: God tosses coin, creates 10 persons if heads and 1000 persons if tails.
B: God tosses coin, creates 10 persons if heads and 1010
100
persons if tails.
C: God tosses coin, creates 1000 persons if heads and 1010
100
persons if tails.
His presentation is cryptic, but it's clear (it helps to be antecedently aware of an
event/theory distinction) that Lewis subjects the toss of the coin (an indexical
matter) to selection eects, but does not subject the choice of theory (a non-
indexical matter) to such eects. In particular, he advocates that observers put
the probability of M = there are 1010
100
persons at approximately 2
3
.10
There are traces of an event/theory distinction in the writings of philosophers as
well. John Leslie (1996, p. 248-250) suggested that selection pressures apply to
Doomsday alternatives only if the process choosing which is actual is \radically
indeterministic", and Nick Bostrom (2007) noted (the so-called \Presumptuous
Philosopher gedanken") that it is less tempting to subject a \theory of everything"
9There are exceptions. Theories that predict no observers with certainty are obviously re-
futed by any observations whatsoever, and contingent propositions picked out by non-indexical
expressions might (if there are such things) be exceptional as well. Lewis (2001) discusses the-
ories that predict no observers with non-trivial probability, but oers only speculations as to
how anthropic reasoning should treat such cases. These issues run orthogonal to our task here.
10Lewis would put pS(B) = pS(C) = pO(B) = pO(C) = 1=3 (no selection eect), and
pS(M jB) = 10
10
100
=(1010
100
+ 10), pS(M jC) = 10
10
100
=(1010
100
+ 1000) (selection eect). Note:
Lewis is explicit that his anthropic reasoning treats nite cases as if they were iterated (under
the auspices of the same theory) ad innitum. So this case is relevant for us, despite its niticity.
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to the selection pressures that rational agents (Sleeping Beauty thirders, more
generally) subject indexicals such as \the coin in question landed heads" to.11
A symbolic dynamics example
Here's a parting shot for those still on the fence. Suppose you know that you
are the only conscious being in the universe, are immortal, and that all of your
conscious observations are completely determined by a process that spits out
characters a1; a2; : : : from the alphabet. Initially there are two equally likely
candidate stationary theories describing the local statistical features of the output:
Theory A: P (an = \C") =
1
103
; P (an+1 = \E"jan = \C") =
1
3
.
Theory B: P (an = \C") =
1
106
; P (an+1 = \E"jan = \C") =
2
3
.
You know that you spend most of your existence asleep, but that whenever a \C"
is spat out, you are aroused and get to observe the next letter spat, after which
your memory of the episode is erased and you are put back to sleep.
Now...if you nd yourself awake and having an observation of an \E", which
theory should that conrm? On the method of anthropic reasoning I have been
advocating for in this paper, it conrms Theory B. (Your posterior probability
that Theory B is true should be 2
3
.) That the rst process would give you more
(per unit time) \E"-observations is irrelevant, because your unconscious moments
don't count for anything. (Why would they?) In other words, it's the frequency
of \E" observations in the stream of observations that matters, not the frequency
of \E" observations in the stream of all moments (conscious or not). To put it
another way, no selection eect favors the rst process.
Conclusion
If the arguments I've given are correct then Huemer left out something crucial in
assuming, with no justication, that there was \no reason to think that whatever
would block the objection in the infertility case would somehow allow the objection
to succeed in the reincarnation case". There is a reason, because what blocks the
objection in the infertility case, namely selection pressure induced by the context
sensitivity or indexicality of the rival hypotheses considered there, is not present
in the reincarnation case, since the rival hypotheses there are non-indexical. If
that's right, it'll take some new argument to resurrect reincarnation. Until then,
I'd advise against crossing anything o your bucket list you don't remember doing.
11Probably neither Leslie nor Bostrom would arm the event/theory distinction entirely,
however, especially conditional on the universe being nite. In a passage remnicient of Huemer
(2019), for example, Bostrom (2001) wrote: \...it is hard to see what the relevant dierence is
between" a case in which the number of observers is a matter of theory and a case in which
the number of observers is determined by coin tossing. However, given that Bostrom held
that members of an observer's \reference class" ought to be actual, in an innite universe
his anthropic reasoning agrees with that of Carter and Lewis. (In an innite universe, the
asymptotic statistics converge to that of the underlying theory almost surely.) Huemer's position
may be closest to the one that Bostrom attributes to his \Presumptuous Philosopher", in which
observers belonging to nomologically impossible worlds (Permissive theory of persons worlds,
perhaps) can gure into the calculations of probabilities in self-selection experiments.
EXISTENCE IS NOT EVIDENCE FOR IMMORTALITY 8
References
Bostrom, Nick. 2001. The Doomsday Argument, Adam & Eve, UN++, and
Quantum Joe. Synthese 127(3):359-387.
Bostrom, Nick. 2007. Sleeping Beauty and Self-Location: a Hybrid Model. Syn-
these 157(1):59-78.
Carter, Brandon. 1983. The Anthropic Principle and its Implications for Biologi-
cal Evolution. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series
A, Mathmatical and Physical Sciences. 310:347-363.
Chalmers, David. 1996. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental The-
ory. OUP, Oxford.
Huemer, Michael. 2019. Existence is Evidence for Immortality. Nous. Forthcom-
ing.
Leslie, J. 1996. The End of the World: The Science and Ethics of Human Ex-
tinction. New York: Routledge.
Lewis, Antony. 2001. Comparing cosmological theories. Online. Available at
http://cosmologist.info/anthropic.html.
Version of February 19, 2020
rmcctchn@memphis.edu
